REGULAR OFFICER RETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS; A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

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A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

by

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to view the regular officer retention problem, within the Marine Corps, as the author sees it and in quantified form. To this end representative costs have been assigned to the various general tasks of procuring and training a regular officer, and an attempt is made to determine what portion of these costs may have been lost through failure to retain him on active duty for at least a minimum of twenty years.

Since direct cost figures, of the nature desired, are not readily available at the Marine Corps activities visited by the author, the cost figures contained herein are not accurate, historical costs. They are, however, the author feels, representative, minimum costs and are useful, in that light, in attempting to determine the least investment the American people have made in gaining a regular Marine officer.

Further, it is recognized that it is not possible, or even desirable, that the active duty ranks of the Marine Corps officer structure be staffed entirely by regular officers. This study will take no issue with this point. However, since the Marine Corps regular officer input has been only a small portion of all officer input it would appear desirable to retain the

maximum number possible of these accessions.

Again, attention is invited to the fact that the bases for many of the cost figures were of the author's contrivance. An attempt has been made clearly to identify these. Additionally, where possible, every effort is made to insure that costs, based on these contrived bases, are understated, rather than overstated in order to insure that the costs presented are minimum costs.

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROCUREMENT[1]

To understand the regular officer retention problem within the Marine Corps it is important that we understand the sources of Marine Corps officers and the manner in which applicants are obtained from these sources. To this end the following brief history of Marine Corps officer procurement is offered.

From the time the Continental Congress adopted its resolution creating two Marine battalions and urged that "particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to office or enlisted into said battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required," the Marine Corps has experienced varying periods of time in which retention of officers was a problem.

Beginning with the first post Revolutionary War Commandant, William Ward Burroughs, until the outbreak of the Civil War, the commandants of the Marine Corps took a personal interest in the

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[1] Bernard C. Nalty, Marine Corps Officer Procurement: A Brief History, Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No 7, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C., December, 1958.

appointment of officers from civil life and personally selected those who were commissioned.

Soon after the outbreak of the Civil War, Congress modified the Marine Corps system of officer procurement to make eligible for commission only young men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five who passed a professional examination drawn up and administered by the Secretary of the Navy.

In 1882, Congress again modified the system and directed that the Marine Corps obtain some of its second lieutenants from the Naval Academy. However, this source proved insufficient, by itself to meet the expansion needs of the Spanish American War, and additional officers were commissioned from the ranks and from civil life.

Here we have the first indications of the simultaneous use of what has proven to be the three major sources of officer input to the Marine Corps--the Naval Academy, enlisted ranks, and civil life. Depending upon the needs of the times, the Marine Corps has continued to use these sources, with varying degrees of emphasis, up to the present day.

During the emergency brought about by World War I, and our subsequent entry into that war, from 1914 to 1920, the major source of all officer procurement was the enlisted ranks. Also, during this time, a program was initiated which authorized the appointment of applicants from civil life to become second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve. Selected officers from

this program were allowed to be discharged later and to be reappointed to the permanent, regular Marine Corps.

The fact that the majority of all officers, during World War I, were procured from the ranks was the result of a policy initiated by Major General George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1914. His opinion was that the officer corps should be staffed entirely by graduates of the Naval Academy and men from the enlisted ranks. The fact that this policy did not serve the needs of the Marine Corps did not become obvious until 1921. At that time the Marine Corps was attempting to extricate itself from its first serious officer shortage problem of the twentieth century, and was having trouble doing it. Demobilization after World War I, had left 564 vacancies in the ranks of the permanent regular officers. Emergency action, in the form of appointing a board to deal with the problem, was necessary, and it was not until such action was taken that the problem was solved.

During the 1920's the Marine Corps used the same three general sources of procurement cited above, but modified its civil source to include only graduates of military colleges and universities who were recommended by the presidents of those institutions. However, the policy initiated by General Barnett still underlay the actions of the Marine Corps for, when vacancies in the officer structure were limited, applicants were first selected from the Naval Academy, then from the enlisted ranks, and finally from civil life.

In 1925, the Marine Corps Reserve, which had its abortive introduction to the military scene in 1916, was reemphasized and a coordinated effort was made to obtain peacetime reserve officers to staff Marine Corps Reserve companies. These companies were being established throughout the United States and the intent was to staff them with officers who had previous, honorable, active service in one of the armed forces of the United States. This attempt proved unsuccessful and led to a revision of the requirements for obtaining a reserve commission. With this revision, reserve appointments were offered to graduates of accredited colleges who were not required to have any prior military experience.

In 1926, Congress also established the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, of which the Marine Corps Reserve Officer Training Corps was a small part. The purpose of this program was to provide the Marine Corps with junior officers from the graduating classes of several selected universities. However, the program never proved satisfactory for Marine Corps purposes and, in 1934, Marine Corps support, in the form of instructors, was withdrawn.

In 1935, the Marine Corps initiated the platoon leader's class program. This program provided college students commissions as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve, upon graduation, after attendance at two summer, six weeks

training sessions. These sessions were conducted at Quantico, Virginia, and the students attended as members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

With the advent of World War II, the procurement picture shifted somewhat and various programs, e.g., V-12 and the college training program, were instituted. These programs were aimed at procuring college graduates for the officer corps. Also, in 1940, the officer candidate course, a three months course of instruction open to graduates of accredited colleges, was initiated at Quantico. This course led to a reserve commission.

With respect to commissioning in the Regular Marine Corps the late 1930's showed an almost complete reversal of General Barnett's ideas, and the bulk of regular officers were appointed from civilian sources, whereas very few were appointed from the ranks.

During World War II, input to the officer ranks, both regular and reserve, was from the Naval Academy, the V-12 program, the college training program, field commissions, and the officer candidate classes. Again, the specific source used depended upon the specific needs of the times but now the emphasis was shifted to procuring applicants with college training.

After World War II, the Marine Corps allowed its officer candidate course, V-12, and college training programs to lapse and again looked primarily to the Naval Academy, augmented by the rejuvenated Naval Reserve Officer Training Course, for its officer input.

The platoon leader's class was revived on a grand scale, soon after World War II, and this course became the third major source of regular and reserve officers. Additionally, commissions were still tendered outstanding enlisted men and selected graduates of Air Force and Army reserve officer training programs.

With the advent of the Korean conflict a number (500) of temporary commissions were awarded outstanding master sergeants, warrant officers, and commissioned warrant officers. Two other programs were also initiated, at this time, to meet a growing requirement for specialists and technicians, the warrant officer program and the limited duty officer program.

Today the Marine Corps employs, as the sources of most of its male officers, regular and reserve, the Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve Officer training program, the platoon leader's class, the officer candidate course, the meritorious non-commissioned officer program, selected graduates of Army and Air Force reserve officer training programs, the limited duty officer program, the warrant officer program, and the Navy enlisted scientific education program.

Since the Spanish American War, the Marine Corps has used, at varying times, as a source of its permanent, regular officers, the Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve Officer training corps, and a system of selection from within its own ranks. This selection from within has become characteristic of the Marine Corps and involves the augmentation of selected reserve (and in the past,

temporary) officers for regular, permanent appointments.

For example, and as indicated above, subsequent to World War I, demobilization left a total of 564 vacancies in the strength of the officer corps. In dealing with this problem selections for permanent commissions were made from among the temporary officers, both regular and reserve, who had served in the active Marine Corps during the war, and enlisted men and warrant officers who had held war-time commissions.

Figure 1 shows the relationship of regular officer accessions to reserve officer accessions during the period 1952-1962. This figure deals with accessions making their initial entry into officer ranks.

Figure 2 gives an illustration of the importance of augmentation from within during the period 1960-1962.

Since the regulars from other sources, illustrated in Figure 2, are in part college students who are fulfilling an active duty requirement incurred as a result of the federal government subsidizing their education, and since many of these officers can be expected to leave the active Marine Corps upon fulfillment of this requirement, the augmentation program, which deals with officers selecting a career after being exposed to it, carries a degree of permanence and, therefore, becomes important in any consideration of the Marine Corps regular officer structure.

ACCESSIONS TO OFFICER STRENGTH FY 1952-1962
(Shaded Area Shows Regular Accessions)[a]



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[a] Code DPH, Headquarters USMC, "Accessions to Officer Strength FY 1952-1962."

Figure 1

INPUT OF REGULAR OFFICERS, FISCAL YEARS 1960-1962[a]

Source	Fiscal Year 1960	1961	1962
Augmentation Program (includes captains, 1st lieutenants and 2nd lieutenants)	288	259	296
Other sources (includes 2nd lieutenants only)	361	261	312
Total	649	520	608
% of total regular accessions provided through augmentation	44	49.8	48.7

[a] Files of the G-1 (Statistics) Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, March 1963.

Figure 2

Emphasis is placed on this point at this time in order to provide a basis for assumptions and conclusions to be made later in this study.

Thus, we have seen a brief history of Marine Corps officer procurement. Now let us consider the scope of the problem which has arisen from our failure to retain as permanent, regular officers, a sufficient number of those officers procured.

CHAPTER II

THE REGULAR OFFICER RETENTION PROBLEM DEFINED

In this study, when we speak of a regular officer retention problem we are referring to the failure of captains, 1st lieutenants, and 2nd lieutenants to seek and accept permanent, regular appointments in sufficient numbers to fulfill the needs of the permanent, regular structure of the Marine Corps officer corps.

These three ranks form what we shall call the prime promotion base (PPB) which, for our purposes, is the lowest grouping of permanent, regular officers eligible for promotion from which all other groupings of permanent, regular officers flow (upward). This selection of a PPB is made on the assumption that we cannot be certain that an officer has become a careerist until he has completed his eighth to tenth year of active commissioned service. Once he has passed this milestone we can be 90% certain that he has decided to make a career of the military.[1]

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[1] Authoritative confidential sources.

Promotions within the Marine Corps are basically internal. They result from the recommendations of a promotion board, which are endorsed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States. In its action the promotion board considers a specifically designated number of officers, from the officers precedence list (lineal list), and from this group selects a specifically authorized number for promotion. This number is generally smaller than the number considered, thus forcing a degree of attrition in the promotion process, with attrition becoming more severe as selections involve the more senior officer ranks. In practice, the officers considered are presently serving in the rank immediately junior to that for which they are competing. Whatever the rank this group of officers constitutes a promotion base which can be traced back to the PPB, since all of the officers considered were once members of the PPB.

In theory, each promotion base, which is senior to the PPB, represents a purification of that base. The degree of purification depends upon the relative seniority of the promotion base considered. For example, officers selected for promotion to major from within the PPB represent, in relation to the number considered, the most qualified of those eligible. When this group of officers, as members of a promotion base made up of majors, are considered for selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel forced attrition will again generate purification and

only the most qualified will be selected. This procedure will continue until, ultimately, the most qualified are selected for promotion to general officer.

From this it can be concluded that the quality of officer in any rank is only as good as the highest quality in the promotion base from which he was selected. This is almost axiomatic. Therefore, if we insure that a promotion base contains the highest quality of officers attainable, the next higher rank, after promotion, will reflect this quality.

It follows then that an improvement in the quality of the PPB will be realized in improved, succeeding, senior promotion bases.

A good PPB can be described in many ways. For our purposes it is one which is staffed by a large number of career motivated, professional, permanent, regular officers, who have demonstrated their ability through actual performance of duty. The value of this PPB will be affected by a lessening or intensification in degree of either number or quality.

We will concern ourselves primarily with the problem of numbers, that is, the requirement that the Marine Corps retain in the PPB a large number of career motivated, professional, permanent, regular officers. Since the authorized strength of the Marine Corps is subject to change we will not attempt to define an exact number except to say that it should be sufficiently large so as to enable a promotion board truly to

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

select, from a group of officers eligible for promotion, a smaller group representing those <u>most</u> qualified. A base composed of such a number would lessen the possibility of selection of marginally qualified officers who, if the base were appreciably smaller, might be selected because of a need to promote a specific number to fill specific vacancies.

We have described a good PPB as one which is staffed with a large number of permanent, regular officers. When we examine the Marine Corps PPB we recognize that it is staffed also with a large number of reserve officers. It is recognized that reserve officers must be trained in sufficient numbers to provide a mobilization base in case of armed conflict. It is further recognized that fulfillment of this requirement will require a number of these reserve officers to be on active duty in the PPB. For this reason, in this study, when we speak of reserve officers weakening the PPB we do not refer to those who are serving on active duty in fulfillment of mobilization base requirements. Such reserve officers are usually serving only their minimum active duty requirement and are serving in the ranks of 2d lieutenant and 1st lieutenant. With respect to those reserve officers who are serving beyond this requirement it may be said that the PPB is weakened when their numbers increase and strengthened when their numbers decrease. Such officers are usually serving in billets intended to be filled by permanent regular officers.

Figures 3 and 3A provide a picture of the distribution of officers, actual and desired, for fiscal years 1960, 1961 and 1962. These figures include both regular officers and reserve officers on active duty. As can be seen, there was little difference, overall, between the desired number and actual numbers of officers for that three year period. The rank of 2d lieutenant does show shortages but there was an overage in numbers in the PPB overall. It must also be noted that there was an overage in the total officer structure for two of the three years cited and that the percentage of the total of all officers actually taken up by the PPB was smaller than the percentage of the total of all officers desired to be taken up by PPB.

Looking deeper, we discover that a large percentage of the PPB was made up of reserve officers and that this percentage increased from FY 1960 to FY 1962. See Figure 4. This could be an indication that the prime promotion base may be weakening with respect to the presence of career motivated officers who desire regular, permanent commissions.

Further, Figure 5 indicates that an increase of 500 officers (total) in the Marine Corps from FY 1961 to FY 1962 saw an increase of 1222 reserve officers on active duty and a decrease of 874 permanent regular officers in the PPB. Additionally between 96% and 97% of all reserve officers on active duty were then serving in the PPB. This is further indication of a possible weakening of the PPB.

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS[a]
(actual and desired)

Rank	Fiscal Year					
	1960		1961		1962	
	Actual	Desired	Actual	Desired	Actual	Desired
Total Marine Corps	16215	16200	16162	16200	16885	16700
Captains	4563	4519	4266	4276	4263	4259
1st lieutenants	3808	4125	4207	4514	4116	4423
2d lieutenants	2568	2306	2391	2067	2833	2278

[a] Files of G-1 Division (Officer Plans and Statistics) Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).

Figure 3

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS[a]
COMMON SIZE PERCENTAGES

Rank	Fiscal Year					
	1960		1961		1962	
	Actual	Desired	Actual	Desired	Actual	Desired
Total Marine Corps	100	100	100	100	100	100
Captains	28	28	26	26	25	26
1st lieutenants	23	26	26	28	24	26
2d lieutenants	16	14	15	13	14	14

[a] Files of G-1 Division (Officer Plans and Statistics) Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).

Figure 3A

OFFICER STRUCTURE (END STRENGTHS)[a]
PRIME PROMOTION BASE
(RESERVE STRENGTHS IN PARENTHESIS)

Rank	Fiscal Year		
	1960	1961	1962
Total Officers (all ranks)	16215 (4951)	16162 (4964)	16885(6282)
Captains	4563 (583)	4266 (566)	4263(1225)
1st lieutenants	3808 (2304)	4207 (2440)	4116(2560)
2d lieutenants	2568 (1911)	2391 (1821)	2833(2264)
% of PPB who are Reserve officers	43.86	44.43	53.95

[a] Files of G-1 Division (Officer Plans and Statistics) Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).

Figure 4

TABULATION OF ACTIVE DUTY RESERVE OFFICERS SERVING IN THE RANKS OF CAPTAIN, 1ST LIEUTENANT AND 2D LIEUTENANT[c]

Rank	Fiscal Year					
	1960		1961		1962	
	a	b	a	b	a	b
Captain	583	13	566	13	1225	29
1st lieutenant	2304	61	2440	58	2560	62
2d lieutenant	1911	74	1821	76	2264	80
Total reserve officers on active duty in these ranks.	4798		4827		6049	
Total reserve officers on active duty in all ranks.	4951		4964		6282	
Percent of total reserve officers on active duty serving in PPB	97		97		96	

[a] Number of reserve officers on active duty in this rank.

[b] Percent of total reserve officers on active duty.

[c] Files of G-1 (Statistics) Division, HQMC.

Figure 5

It is no disparagement of reserve officers to point out the weakening effect of their increased numbers in the PPB. The concern in this matter does not stem from any question of the qualification of reserve officers, but from the fact that the permanent regular officer structure, which rests on this base, is thereby being limited to an increasingly smaller group of officers from which to select. Should this trend continue it could result in the elimination of the system of selectivity through creating an insufficiency of permanent, regular officers, with respect to filling billet vacancies, to enable a selection. The extreme would be automatic promotions with complete elimination of competition.

The question could now be raised as to why all this concern for selectivity. Why is there a need to select the most qualified? Is it not sufficient to promote, by seniority, those officers who were so carefully screened on their entry into the Marine Corps? If there arose a need for a larger number of officers than the regular officer corps could provide, could not reserve officers provide continuing assistance in the form of active duty officers?

To answer these questions, let us consider the career military officer.

CHAPTER III

THE REGULAR OFFICER

Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein described the career officer of the 1930's as follows:

> Career officers for their part, were a fairly closed group. They were brought up to think of themselves as apolitical and seldom voted or qualified themselves to vote, even in the relatively few states with practicable absentee voting laws, or give much attention to local civic affairs. It was common for the sons of officers to secure appointments to West Point or the Naval Academy, to follow their father's career. Service codes inculcated a slight distaste for the money making goals of businessmen--which did not extend, however, to the top levels of finance and industry--and service traditions took a generally aristocratic view of society and a conservative view of domestic political and social issues, though the officers themselves held no elite status in civil society. Service careers were simply outside the main currents of American life.[1]

Further, they described the position of the military establishment, in this period of government spending, as being responsible for 17.5% of the total government outlay:

> The entire outlay in the military establishment amounted to no more than $700 million out of total expenditures of $4 billion for FY 1930.[2]

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[1] Millis, Walter, with Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 21.

[2] Ibid.

This attitude and this posture were outgrowths of the American people's historical distrust of large standing armies and of the fear of the potential threat of military involvement in politics. Two of our most respected presidents voiced this distrust in speeches to the American people given over 150 years apart. George Washington warned that the United States should

> . . . avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.[1]

Dwight D. Eisenhower, on 17 January 1961, brought Washington's warning up to date.

> Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry; American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.
>
> This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence--economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
>
> In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

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[1] George D. Patterson, III, "Should Politics be Taboo?," _United States Naval Institute Proceedings_, September, 1962, p. 40.

> We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.[1]

The end of World War II, however, presented a changed world, one in which the position of the military and the requirements which must be placed upon it were also changed. George Fielding Eliot described this period as one of

> . . . paradox: a period in which we work for peace, with better prospects of attaining it than before yet a period in which we must maintain greater and more immediately ready armaments than ever before.[2]

In evaluating the military man who existed prior to World War II, and who provided the leadership during World War II, if we subscribe to the opinion of Walter Millis that this war showed that the doctrine of pure war, to which military men subscribed up to that time, proved unfit when tested,[3] then we must agree that military men must be trained to a higher capacity than that which simply produces a battle won. Rather, he must be trained to a capacity which produces a battle won in such a manner as to provide for fulfillment of the overall political desires of his country.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[2] George Fielding Eliot, The Strength We Need, (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), p. 9.

[3] Millis, p. 114.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

If we do not subscribe to this thought we must at least agree to the existence of a post World War II necessity for a large standing military establishment, equipped and trained to protect the interests of the United States in the most efficient manner possible. No longer, as General Eisenhower pointed out, can we "risk emergency improvisation of national defense."[1]

But,where does the young officer, the 2d lieutenant, 1st lieutenant, and captain fit into this changed picture?

Charles Hitch and Roland McKean write:

> In an all-out thermonuclear war the superior economic war potential of the United States is important only to the extent that it has been effectively diverted to security purposes before a war starts.[2]

Part of this potential is the manpower which William Kintner described as follows:

> Perhaps the most vital element in a defense organization is the manpower within it. . . . Policies, plans and weapons are meaningless when separated from the human beings who develop and utilize them.[3]

Manpower must be utilized, intelligently and efficiently, and, within the military, the planners and users of manpower today are the military leaders who were yesterday's 2d lieutenants, 1st lieutenants and captains. Tomorrow's leaders

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[1] Patterson, p. 41.

[2] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 15.

[3] William R. Kintner, Forging a New Sword, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1958), p. 21.

are today serving in these junior ranks and future leaders are civilians today being motivated, or not motivated as the case may be, toward a military career.

The attitude of the American people seems to have changed towards the threat of a large, standing military establishment. This is evidenced by the existence of one for over twelve years, with no decisive attempt having been made to reduce it to pre-World War II levels. This may be due to a subjugation of the innate distrust, described above, to a greater force, the need to face the Communist threat from a position of strength, or it may be an awareness, brought out by World War II, that a large military establishment does not, in fact, pose a threat to our democratic freedoms.[1]

However it has come about, the American people now have, and accept a military establishment which proposes to spend, in FY 1964, $51 billion, which constitutes 52% of the total executive budget.[2]

Within this changed world and this changed attitude the young officer has a position as a future leader. John W. Masland and Lawrence Radway describe his role as follows:

> To attain national security objectives without resort to war requires a national strategy in which the disposition of military forces is integrated with political bargaining, policy statements, alliance,

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[1] Millis, p. 66.

[2] Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, The Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1964, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 59-60.

> foreign economic policy, propaganda, and any and all measures that may foster the growth of friendly factions within foreign governments. . . . The role of the military officer of tomorrow would be even less conventional than the role he has played in the recent past.[1]

Walter Millis described the effect of the change in the armed services.

> It was in the early 1950's that the Army, Navy, and Air Force began to realize the enormity of the obligations that were being thrust upon them. They had to produce not simply competent combat commanders and staff specialists in logistics, but a whole corps of military statesmen, capable of filling the innumerable politico-military staff positions in the Pentagon, in the U. N., in NATO, in the trust territories, in the MAAG groups which were yawning after and devouring politically aware military personnel.[2]

From all this it is clear that the career military officer must meet requirements today which are formidable and which have rarely, if ever, been laid upon his predecessors. But, who or what is this career military officer who must meet these requirements?

Generally, the career military officer, referred to in this paper also as a regular officer or a permanent, regular officer, is considered to be a professional. Samuel Huntington describes the modern officer corps as a professional body, characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness,

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[1] John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 26.

[2] Millis, p. 360.

and the military officer as a professional man.[1] He amplifies this description, stating that the officer is a professional in the sense of one who pursues a "higher calling" in the service of society.

Morris Janowitz updated Huntington's comments and described an officer as one who must be sensitized

> . . . to political and social consequences of military action. . . . In order for the military manager of the future to operate effectively in foreign areas, many years of experience--perhaps 10 to 15 years--are required.[2]

From these comments it appears that the professional officer is one who must work at his profession full time; one who sees his profession as a way of life more than a job; and, one who must be continually educated through rotation among various assignments and duties as well as through formal, professional education, to increase his qualification within his profession.

This definition automatically excludes the reserve officer whose primary mission is to become as qualified as possible to serve on active duty should that requirement arise. He is a part-time professional who has devotedly given of his time to be prepared "when needed" but who, through his own preference or for some other reason, does not desire or is not

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[1] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 7.

[2] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (Illinois: The Free Press of Glenco, 1960), p. 26.

qualified to serve full time as a permanent, regular officer. Consequently, he is limited in expertise by not being involved in full time professional training and experience; in responsibility by not being full responsive to the same influences which affect the permanent regular officer; and in corporateness by not being a full time member of the professional body, the officer corps.

While our history is replete with war after war being won by its citizen soldiers, among whom reserves stand in the forefront, their purpose is to serve in time of need and not as permanent regular members of the regular officer structure. If it were otherwise they would cease to be reserves.

Thus we see that reserve officers do not serve the needs of the modern military profession, even though on active duty. Although they are performing essential duties, they are not the source from which senior, regular officers are selected; and these senior, regular officers are the intended users of the resource manpower.

However, reserve officers have historically served as a source of regular officers. Presently this mutation is accomplished through the medium of augmentation. Thus, within the PPS, we discover a mutation caused on the one hand by permanent, regular officers leaving active service and on the other hand by reserve officers accepting appointments as regular officers. Figure 6 pictures total accessions and total attrition, within the PPB, by rank, during FY 1960, 1961, and 1962.

ACCESSIONS AND ATTRITION AMONG PERMANENT, REGULAR OFFICERS
IN THE PPB, DURING FY 1960, 1961 AND 1962[a]

Rank	FY 1960		FY 1961		FY 1962	
	Accession	Attrition	Accession	Attrition	Accession	Attrition
Captain	2	159	22	206	15	292
1st lieutenant	242	222	195	231	123	197
2d lieutenant	408	5	343	4	475	7

	Total Accessions	Total Attrition
Captain	39	657
1st lieutenant	560	650
2d lieutenant	1226	16

[a] Files of the G-1 (Statistics) Division, HQMC.

Figure 6

Figure 7 shows augmentation, by rank, during that same period.

Thus we have the problem better defined. Reduced to its simplest terms, we may say that the quality of our future Marine Corps leaders depends upon the quality of the PPB from which they will be initially selected. Further, any failure to procure a sufficient number of officers adequately to staff this PPB will very possibly reduce the quality of these future leaders.

AUGMENTATION BY RANK FROM USMCR TO USMC[a]

Rank	FY 1960	FY 1961	FY 1962	Total
Captain	1	8	15	24
1st lieutenant	232	84	168	484
2d lieutenant	55	167	113	335
Total				843

[a] Files of G-1 (Statistics) Division, HQMC.

Figure 7

Presently, it would appear that we are not procuring sufficient permanent, regular officers adequately to staff this PPB. In this we could be endangering the future superior quality of Marine Corps leaders and will continue to do so until we build up an adequate PPB.

This is the problem, and these are the ramifications. But let us consider how many other resources we have invested in these officers who are failing to remain and what this means to the Marine Corps in terms of investment lost. How much does it cost to procure and train these future leaders to meet the requirements which they must face?

CHAPTER IV

OFFICER PROCUREMENT, QUANTIFIED

For the purposes of this study the cost of procuring officers includes all identifiable costs incident to the procurement process and the training of applicants, including cadets, up to the time when they accept commissions in the United States Marine Corps or the United States Marine Corps Reserve. The scope of this study is not sufficiently broad to allow for the detailed research necessary to unearth all costs incurred in the procurement of officers. Therefore, what follow may be considered merely as representative minimum costs. These costs were derived through logical inference as well as from recorded history. Additionally, detailed costing has been limited to those sources of officer accessions which the author considers as prime sources--those which produced approximately 75% of total officer accessions in the ten years from fiscal year 1952 to fiscal year 1962.

Programs leading to a commission as a 2d lieutenant have already been costed both as to procurement and as to training. The costs of these programs are as follows:

1. The Naval Academy. The most currently estimated cost of procurement and training of a midshipman is $28,500.[1] This cost includes all expenditures at the Naval Academy identified as being applicable to midshipman maintenance and training.

2. The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates regular and reserve officers at different costs. A regular NROTC accession costs approximately $9,100; a reserve NROTC accession, $3,300.[2] This cost includes all expenditures made under budget items Naval Personnel (Operations and Maintenance), Reserve Personnel Navy, Military Pay Navy, and Military Pay Marine Corps, as well as the costs of civilian staff overhead administrative upkeep, testing, uniforms, books, instructional equipment, and the like.

3. Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP). The average cost of a graduate of this program for fiscal year 1962 was $14,496.[3] This cost includes tuition, books, and the pay and allowances of the marine enrolled in the program.

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[1] Interview with Commander Robert H. Ewing, USN, Bureau of Naval Personnel, March, 1963.

[2] Interview with Mr. Henry K. Moulthrop, Bureau of Naval Personnel, March, 1963.

[3] Files of the Fiscal Division, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March, 1963.

In considering the remaining programs, we discover that applicants for the platoon leader's class (PLC), the marine aviation cadet program (MARCAD), the officer candidate course (OCC), and the woman's officer candidate course (WOCC) are generally procured by the same activity, the military personnel procurement service (officer selection) of the Marine Corps.

Limited records make uneconomical any attempt at determining what percentage of the procurement effort, and therefore what percentage of procurement cost, is applicable to each program. Consequently, we will consider all programs as having received equal attention from the procurement agencies. Based upon this assumption, Figure 8 lists costs applicable to the officer procurement effort for fiscal year 1962.

During fiscal year 1962, the Marine Corps accepted 4900 PLC, OCC, MARCAD, and WOCC applications at a cost of $277.09 per application. However, this figure represents a "gross" and not a "net" cost. Since our purpose is to define procurement costs as closely as possible, we must consider the cost of procurement not in terms of applications accepted but in terms of applicants commissioned.

Figure 9 is a study of estimated attrition within the platoon leader's class from time of enrollment to time of commissioning. The attrition may have been voluntary, on the part of the applicant, or it may have been the result of the applicant's failure to qualify for any one of many reasons.

COSTS INCIDENT TO THE PROCUREMENT OF APPLICANTS FOR THE PLC, OCC, WOCC, AND MARCAD, FISCAL YEAR 1962[a]

Activity			Total Funds Expended by Activity ($)
Project 42, Operations and Maintenance			214,437.00
Project 44, Media			150,000.00
Pay and allowances (estimated) of personnel assigned to Officer Selection Teams.[b]			
Rank	Number	Total Pay & Allowances	
Major	4[c]	41,294.48	
Captain	40[d]	332,258.24	
1st Lt.	22[e]	158,697.96	
E-7	9	54,419.31	
E-5	84	406,641.48	993,311.47
Total expenditures			1,357,748.47

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[a] Files of the Military Personnel Procurement Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC.

[b] See Appendix 3. For purposes of this study it is considered that no officer had former enlisted service; all officers are married; one-half of the enlisted men are married; all enlisted men are drawing standard maintenance allowance; all enlisted men have been issued the small blue uniform supplementary allowance; all enlisted men are subsisting with rations in kind not available; and no enlisted man has been awarded proficiency pay.

[c] Includes one marine aviator.

[d] Includes four marine aviators.

[e] Includes thirteen marine aviators.

Figure 8

ESTIMATED AVERAGE ATTRITION WITHIN THE PLC (BASED ON AVAILABLE RECORDS FROM FISCAL YEAR 1956 TO FISCAL YEAR 1962)

Fiscal Year	Estimated Number Enrolled[a]	Number Ordered to Training[b]	Number Commissioned[c]
1956	1744	1500	[d]
1957	2327	2001	548
1958	2105	1810	492
1959	1890	1625	581
1960	2343	2015	585
1961	2674	2300	566
1962	2442	2100	580
Total	15525	13351	3352
Average	2218	1907	559

[a] This figure was not economically available for all years. What is shown here is estimated from a known average attrition of 14% in the program between enrollment and initial orders to summer training.

[b] Provided from the records of the Reserve Officer Candidate section of the Military Personnel Procurement Branch, Headquarters U. S. M. C.

[c] Code DPH, Headquarters U. S. M. C., "Accessions to Officer Strength, Fiscal Years 1952-1962."

[d] No applicant enrolled in 1956 would have been commissioned in 1956.

Figure 9

Consequently it would appear that if the average attrition shown in Figure 9 is representative of PLC attrition overall, of the 2454 PLC applicants procured in FY 1962, only 614 (25%) will be commissioned, and that a more realistic procurement cost per applicant in their case would be $1107.46 and not $277.09. This is especially so when we consider that the only real test of any effort is in the results it produces.

A similar situation exists with respect to the officer candidate course. Attrition within the officer candidate course, from enrollment to commissioning, is estimated at 40%, 15% prior to training and 25% in training.[1] This adjusts the estimated acquisition cost per officer candidate commissioned to $461.82.

The remaining overall acquisition cost applicable to all candidates commissioned is the cost of administering the overall officer selection program at Headquarters Marine Corps. The only costs readily identifiable in this regard are pay costs. Therefore, Figure 10 is a recapitulation of the personnel, by military rank, civilian government service grade, and pay presently employed solely in officer procurement matters at Headquarters Marine Corps level. Military pay and allowances are as estimated in Figure 10. Civil pay is estimated on the basis that all personnel are serving in grade 3 of the applicable government service rating. Figure 11 shows the average number of

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[1] Interview with Major Parcell, Reserve Officer Candidate Section, Military Personnel Procurement Branch, HQMC.

PERSONNEL, AT HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, EMPLOYED SOLELY IN OFFICER PROCUREMENT AS OF 5 APRIL 1963[a]

Rank[b] or Civilian Grade[c]	Number	Estimated Yearly Total Pay and Allowances
Lt Colonel	1	$11,504.96
Major	3	28,862.97
Captain	2	15,656.24
E-7	2	11,313.94
E-6	1	5,041.02
E-4	1	3,731.23
GS-7	1	5,910.00
GS-6	3	16,125.00
GS-5	4	19,540.00
GS-4	7	30,730.00
GS-3	2	8,060.00
Total yearly pay and allowances		$156,475.36

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[a] Personnel interview with representatives of the Military Personnel Procurement Branch, HQMC.

[b] All military personnel are considered to be married, not drawing incentive or proficiency pay, subsisting where rations in kind are available, and drawing the standard clothing and maintenance allowance.

[c] Estimated civilian pay costs are based on Headquarters, U. S. M. C., "Civilian Employees Information Bulletin," Vol. XV, No. 42, 30 October, 1962.

Figure 10

TOTAL ACCESSIONS TO OFFICER STRENGTH
(REGULAR AND RESERVE)
FY 1956-1962[a]

Fiscal Year		Accessions
1956		2813
1957		1975
1958		2049
1959		1775
1960		1699
1961		1763
1962		2153
	Total	14227
	Average	2032

[a] Code DPH, Headquarters U. S. M. C., "Accessions to Officer Strength, FY 1952-1962."

Figure 11

total officer accessions from fiscal year 1956 to fiscal year 196

From these it can be seen that, if Figure 10 can be considered as representative of the numbers and ranks of personne employed at Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps in officer procurement, their salaries prorated over the average number of officers procured since FY 1956 is $77.01 per officer.

To determine a representative cost of training the candidates for commissioning we must allocate to these candidates those identifiable direct and indirect costs incurred at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. As a base for this calculation we will use expenditures applicable to FY 1963, incurred as of February, 1963, and estimated for the remainder of the year (in the light of the budget). We will also use personnel training figures for fiscal year 1963, actual as of February, 1963, and as planned for the remainder of the year.

Figure 12, extracted from Appendix I, shows the total of student man years of instruction conducted and expected to be conducted in the Training and Test Regiment at Quantico in FY 196 The total effort of this regiment is directed at precommissioning training.

A total of $81,000 is allocated directly to Training and Test Regiment by the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico for expenditure in connection with precommissioning training. This figure reduces to approximately $115.24 per student man year

TABULATION OF STUDENT MAN YEARS OF INSTRUCTION
TRAINING AND TEST REGIMENT
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA
FY 1963[a]

Course	Number of Students Attending	Total Student Man Years of Instruction
PLC Junior[b]	3200	238.80
PLC Senior[c]	2200	159.38
NROTC	334	37.51
WOOSC	150	19.31
OCC	1200	247.88

[a] See Appendix I.

[b] 1st summer training period.

[c] 2d summer training period.

Figure 12

of instruction or \$8.60 per PLC junior, \$8.35 per PLC senior, \$12.94 per NROTC student and \$23.80 per officer candidate course member.

In addition to this cost there are certain overhead costs, which must be allocated among the varying courses, and which total \$26,134,112 or \$11,955.55 per student man year of instruction. This further may be reduced to a cost of \$892.18 per PLC junior, \$866.12 for each PLC senior, \$2469.62 for each OCC member and \$1342.67 for each NROTC student. The procedure used in costing training is treated in more detail in Chapter V.

Because of the attrition already noted above this cost is further refinable. Utilizing Figure 9 as a basis for computation, and utilizing the strength figures contained in Figure 12, we are able to refine the costs of PLC officer accessions as shown in Figure 13. Of the 3200 PLC's initially ordered to training, 928 will be commissioned.[1] In like manner, since an estimated 25% of the officer's candidate class ordered to training will not be commissioned, the cost of each candidate commissioned may be further refined. (See Figure 13).

In summary, it appears that a good, representative, minimum cost for each officer commissioned in the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve, by identified method through which he was selected and trained, would be as shown in Figure 14. Again, attention is invited to the fact that these costs are based on expenditures made during different periods of time which only

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[1] Interview with representatives of the Reserve Officer Section of the Military Personnel Procurement Branch, HQMC, March, 1963.

REFINED COSTS FOR PLC'S AND OCC'S IN THE LIGHT OF ESTIMATED ATTRITION (BASED ON STRENGTHS CONTAINED IN FIGURE 12 AND ATTRITION TREND SHOWN IN FIGURE 8)

Course	Total Costs	Estimated Number to be Commissioned	Estimated cost per Commissioned Officer
PLC	$4,806,330.00	928	$5,179.23
OCC	2,992,104.00	900	3,324.56

Figure 13

ESTIMATED OVERALL COST OF ACQUIRING A 2D LIEUTENANT

Program	Selection Cost	Training Cost	Other Cost	Total Cost
PLC	$1184.55	$5179.23	$1108.94[a]	$ 7472.72
OCC	538.91	3324.56	223.65[a]	4087.12
NROTC				
Regular	9100.00	1342.67[b]		10442.62
Reserve	3300.00	1342.67[b]		4642.67
Naval Academy				28500.00

[a] Includes $140.43 clothing allowance cost and travel costs at the rate of $83.22 (one way).

[b] Training costs incurred at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

Figure 14

relate to each other in that they are representative of costs incurred in acquiring a 2d lieutenant. Attention is also invited to the fact that PLC and OCC costs are understated in that they do not include the pay and allowances of the member students enrolled in these programs.

CHAPTER V

OFFICER TRAINING QUANTIFIED

Of the many costs incurred in preparing an officer for his first duty, those incurred in training are by far the most substantial. In this chapter we will consider these costs in some detail.

The major Marine officer training effort is conducted at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. In fact, it may be said that the entire effort of this activity is devoted to the instruction of students.

In determining the costs applicable to the training of those officers in whom we are most interested, 2d lieutenants who have not as yet reported to their first duty station after training, we must make certain assumptions. These are:

1. That there is a causal connection between all Marine and Naval activities at Quantico, Virginia and the training of Marine Corps and other U. S. military and allied students. For example, the Naval Hospital at Quantico exists to service the military who are at Quantico serving as military instructors, administrative or other support personnel for Marine Corps Schools,

or as students. The same causal connection may be drawn for the Air Facility at Quantico.

There may be a objection to this assumption to the extent that the landing force development center, Marine Corps Schools and the support provided it by certain units of the air facility are not actively engaged in the instruction of students. Since the isolation of the direct and overhead costs attributable to the development center activity would be uneconomical in terms of the costs of obtaining it, it is considered that the costs of operating these activities may be included in this study.

2. That the entire effort of Marine Corps Schools and its supporting activities, the Marine Corps Air Facility and the U. S. Naval Hospital, may be reduced equally to total numbers of student years of instruction or to total dollars expended. Thus,

Total Dollars Expended = Total Number of Student Years of Instruction

3. That Marine Corps and Navy stock fund transactions should be excluded from these cost figures in order to reduce any distortion which may arise from considering the transactions of a revolving fund.

4. That reimbursables in Project 22 and Project 23, should be included in the cost figures since they represent receipts offsetting certain expenditures under these projects and consequently provide funds which, in turn, may be expended.

5. That civilian and military payroll totals for fiscal year 1962, provide an adequate basis for estimating representative pay costs at Quantico.

6. That the courses established to conduct the training of 2d lieutenants prior to their assignment to their first duty station (other than duty under instruction at Quantico) train only 2d lieutenants. Consequently, the frequency with which these courses are used to train officers of other ranks is of such minor incidence as to not appreciably affect ratios and totals based on the assumption that the total student input is in the rank of 2d lieutenant.

7. That the direct training assistance contribution made by the Marine Corps Educational Center to courses other than those conducted within that center are not of sufficient magnitude as to warrant the expense of costing them out.

In support of Marine Corps Schools the U. S. Naval Hospital, Quantico, Virginia expends approximately $850,000 under two Navy operations and maintenance allotments, covering two budget projects, under two separate Navy bureaus.[1]

The Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico, Virginia administers two major allotments, Operations and Maintenance Navy

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[1] Based on fiscal year 1962 data (approximate) provided by a representative of the Comptroller's Office, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, March 1963.

and Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps, covering twenty-four various budget projects, at a cost of approximately $1,900,000. This figure includes $200,000 in reimbursables.[1]

Marine Corps Schools administer two Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps allotments, covering eight budget projects, a subsistence in kind allotment, and several minor projects, at a cost of approximately $7,104,215. Figure 15 gives a detailed description of these expenditure authorizations.

Military salaries, at all facilities at Quantico, in fiscal year 1962, were approximately $19,209,522. Of this figure, for our purposes, we will consider 50%, or $9,604,761 as representative of the salaries of the military, other than students, stationed at Quantico. Although it is estimated that this amount constitutes an understatement of military salaries expense, applicable as overhead costs, it is considered that it serves our purpose of establishing a minimum representative cost. Civilian salaries for that same period were approximately $6,895,350.[2]

Thus a total of approximately $26,554,326 can be expected to be expended either directly or indirectly on the training of students at Marine Corps Schools during fiscal year 1963.

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] The pay and allowance totals were provided by the Disbursing Officer, Marine Corps Schools, whose office pays all military and civilian employees at Marine Corps Schools, the U. S. Naval Hospital, and the Marine Corps Air Facility.

EXPENDITURE AUTHORIZATIONS MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS QUANTICO, VIRGINIA, FISCAL YEAR 1963[a]

Expenditure Authorization	Total Funds Authorized
Project 22	$2,304,652
Project 23	378,915
Project 11	715,748
Project 21	120,475
Subsistence in Kind	1,265,000
Commandant, Marine Corps Schools Contingency Fund	1,912
Marine Corps Reserve Training	28,600
Forestry Management	21,000
Disposal of Surplus Property	76,000
Operations and Maintenance, Dependent School System	958,596
Research, Development, Training, and Education	752,000
Housing	26,000
Reimbursables	455,317
Total	$7,104,215

[a] A C of S Comptroller, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, "Financial Plan, FY 1963, Projects 23, 22, 11, 21," of 4 December 1962;and conversations with members of the Controller's Office, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

Figure 15

To reduce the activity of Marine Corps Schools to a total number of student years of instruction we may employ the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Length of course (in days)}}{365} \times \text{Number of students attending the course} = \text{Total student man years of instruction.}$$

Appendix I contains a schedule of total student years of instruction, conducted or scheduled to be be conducted at Quantico, by course, in fiscal year 1963. Appendix II is a graphic portrayal of the training effort at Marine Corps Schools. In this chapter we are interested in those totals which affect the training of 2d lieutenants. These totals are contained, for convenience, in Figure 16. It is interesting to note that approximately 47% of the total student training effort at Quantico is directed to the training of 2d lieutenants who have yet to report to their first duty station in other than a student status.

To determine what proportion of the total \$26,554,326, is applicable to the training of the 2d lieutenants, in which we are most interested, we must first isolate those direct costs which are expended on individual courses and then allocate the remaining total, the overhead costs, equitably among all the students.

Figure 17 contains the direct cost structure at Marine Corps Schools. These costs are applicable to specific training courses or activities. All other expenditures, \$26,134,112, are considered overhead costs.

SCHEDULE OF COURSES ATTENDED BY 2D LIEUTENANTS SHOWING TOTAL STUDENT YEARS OF INSTRUCTION (FISCAL YEAR 1963)[a]

Course Title	Course Length (days)	Number of Students	Total Student man years of instruction
Communication Officer Orientation Course			
1-63	30	35	2.87
2-63	26	40	2.84
3-63	26	40	2.84
4-63	29	40	3.16
5-63	24	35	2.30
Artillery Officer Orientation Course			
1-63	30	48	3.94
2-63	26	48	3.41
3-63	26	36	2.56
4-63	29	35	2.77
5-63	24	40	2.63
Basic Course			
5-62	144	451	178.71
1-63	172	429	202.14
2-63	194	445	236.52
3-63	187	390	199.80
4-63	177	278	134.80
5-63	37	383	38.80
Woman Officer Basic Course	43	50	5.89
Total			1025.98

[a] See Appendix I.

Figure 16

DIRECT COST STRUCTURE, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
FISCAL YEAR 1963[a]

Activity	Direct Cost
Marine Corps Educational Center	$111,696.00
Basic School	156,068.00
Ordnance School	37,750.00
Women Detachment (Formal School Training)	1,200.00
Training and Test Regiment	81,000.00
Marine Corps Reserve Training	28,000.00
Schools Demonstration Troops (Artillery Officer Orientation Course)	4,500.00
Total	$420,214.00

[a] A C of S Comptroller, Marine Corps Schools, Financial Plan, Fiscal Year 1963.

Figure 17

There will be some distortion in the allocation of overhead costs since teacher and administrative salaries and other costs have been applied generally as overhead costs whereas most are applicable to specific courses and activities. However, these specific costs could not be uncovered economically. Further, since the amounts in military salaries and allowances vary considerably from person to person, due to differences in time in service, marital status, off-base housing, and the like, the procurement of an accurate figure would require the handling of each individual pay record involved. Also the military salary figures are distorted insofar as they do not include the money amount of allotments paid to the military but not by the Disbursing Officer of Marine Corps Schools.[1]

To allocate the indirect training costs to the training effort conducted at Marine Corps Schools we may use the direct labor hours method.[2] This method is illustrated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Indirect Training Costs for FY 1963}}{\text{Total number of student man years of instruction}} = \text{Indirect training cost rate per student man year of instruction}$$

Training cost rate per student man year of instruction X the number of student man years of instruction in a specific course = indirect training costs applicable to that course

$$\frac{\text{Indirect training costs applicable to a specific course}}{\text{Number of students attending that course}} = \text{Indirect training costs per individual student}$$

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[1] Conversation with the Disbursing Officer, Marine Corps Schools, March, 1963.

[2] Ralph Dale Kennedy and Frederick Charles Kurtz, Introductory Accounting, (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Company, 1950), p. 611.

For purposes of simplicity we will consider each course in yearly total and not by the various increments which are completed at different times during the fiscal year. Thus, Figure 18 shows how much of the estimated indirect training costs at Quantico are applicable to each of the students attending Basic Course, Communication Officer Orientation Course, and Artillery Officer Orientation Course. Figure 19 shows the direct costs, per student, applicable to the same courses.

Thus we have a clearer picture of the investment we have in a new officer in terms of minimum costs necessary to prepare him to assume his duties as a commissioned officer responsible for a task to be accomplished.

ESTIMATED INDIRECT TRAINING COSTS APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN OFFICER
STUDENTS, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA
FISCAL YEAR 1963

Course	Indirect Costs (total) ($)	Number of Students	Cost per Student ($)
Basic Course	11,845,200.27	2376	4985.35
Artillery Officer Orientation Course	183,039.47	208	880.00
Communication Officer Orientation Course	167,497.26	190	881.56

Figure 18

ESTIMATED DIRECT COSTS PER OFFICER STUDENT ATTENDING
BASIC COURSE, ARTILLERY OFFICER ORIENTATION
COURSE, AND COMMUNICATION OFFICER COURSE,
MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA
FISCAL YEAR 1963

Course	Direct Costs ($)	Number of Students	Cost per Student ($)
Basic Course	156,068	2376	65.69
Artillery Officer Orientation Course	4,500	208	21.63
Communication Officer Course[a]	3,656[b]	325[c]	11.25

[a] Includes the Communication Officer Orientation Course.

[b] Does not include internal overhead costs within the Marine Corps Educational Center of which this course is a part.

[c] Includes 190 2d lieutenants attending Communication Officer Orientation Course.

Figure 19

Up to this time because of the limited scope of this study we have purposely not included any discussion of aviation officer training costs. However, Appendix IV contains costs in this regard and it would be well to introduce them now when we are considering a representative total officer investment.

Figure 20 lists representative costs for the acquiring and training of specific types of officers. It is emphasized that these costs represent an investment on which no return has yet been exacted, a minimum investment. Nor does this investment include costs incurred in training a ground officer for specific duties in other than the Infantry. Such additional costs may be incurred prior to the officer's reporting to his first duty station but, except for those incurred at Quantico, which are contained in Figures 18 and 19, they were not economically obtainable.

Now, consider manpower as a resource which must be amortized over the period of its useful life if we are to recover our investment in it. Further, consider that the estimated useful life of a permanent, regular officer, as a part of the general classification manpower, is twenty years and that the amortization rate for these officers, per year, may be obtained by dividing twenty into the total cost of acquiring and training them for their first duty.

TOTAL ESTIMATED REPRESENTATIVE COSTS OF ACQUIRING AND TRAINING CERTAIN OFFICERS FOR DUTY IN THE ACTIVE MARINE CORPS

How Acquired	Acquisition Cost ($) (Includes pre-commissioning training) PLUS	Training Cost ($) (Basic School @ $5051.04)[a] PLUS	Flight Training Costs ($) Helicopter or	
			($46,209.87)[a]	Jet ($170,204.82)[a]
Naval Academy	28,500.00	33,551.04	79,760.91	203,755.86
Platoon Leader's Class	7,472.72[a]	12,523.76	58,733.63	182,728.58
Officer Candidate Course	4,087.12[a]	9,138.16	55,348.03	179,342.98
Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program	14,496.00	19,547.04	65,756.91	189,751.86
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (Regular)	10,442.62	15,493.66	61,703.53	185,698.48
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (Reserve)	4,642.67	9,693.71	55,903.58	179,898.53

[a] Does not include student salaries.

Figure 20

With these considerations in mind, let us examine the Marine Corps' prime sources of regular officer input to determine what investment, if any, has been lost in any failure to retain officers obtained from these sources.

The prime sources of regular officer input are the Naval Academy and the NROTC (regular) program. These two sources provided an average of 81% of all regular officer accessions from 1954 to 1959. (See Figure 21). Since these officers have devoted four years of formalized military study, at government expense, to prepare for military service it is considered that, of all who enter the military life, they are most predisposed toward a military career.

A permanent regular ground officer, from one of these sources, who receives no more formal military education, after commissioning, than basic school, amortizes at a yearly rate of $1,677.55, if he was obtained from the Naval Academy, and $774.68, if he was commissioned through the NROTC Program.

If then, we consider each year, of the twenty years not served, as representing a lost investment, we discover that, in this one area of retention alone, provided that all these officers could have been retained the full twenty years and based on the preceding cost figures, we have lost a minimum total investment of $6,628,175.81, during the period from 1954 through 1959. (See Figure 22.) This loss is understated in that it does not include aviation attrition, which would represent approximately two to five times the amortization cost of a ground officer, and it does

ACCESSIONS TO OFFICER STRENGTH, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (FISCAL YEARS 1954 TO 1959)[a]

Fiscal Year	Total Accessions	Total Naval Academy and NROTC (regular) Accessions	Percent of Total Accessions Provided by the Naval Academy and NROTC (regular)
1954	441[b]	358	81
1955	356	303	85
1956	377	324	86
1957	326	250	77
1958	337	246	73
1959	354	272	77

[a] Code DPH, "Accessions to Officer Strength, FY 1952-1962."

[b] Does not include 343 temporary, regular officers.

Figure 21

TOTAL INVESTMENT LOST THROUGH FAILURE TO RETAIN GRADUATES OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY (FISCAL YEARS 1954-1958) AND THE NROTC (REGULAR) PROGRAM (FISCAL YEARS 1955-1959)

Fiscal Year	Total Input[a]	Total Regulars on Active Duty 1 January 1963[b]	Total Regulars Lost as of 1 January 1963 (Amortized through 1 January 1963)	Total Investment Lost (dollars)
NROTC[c]				
1955	247	150	97	939,299.50
1956	273	190	83	868,028.94
1957	188	131	57	640,273.02
1958	176	84	92	1,104,693.68
1959	215	156	59	754,150.98
TOTAL				4,306,446.12
Naval Academy[d]				
1954	64	33	31	650,050.78
1955	56	38	18	407,644.74
1956	51	31	20	486,489.60
1957	61	46	15	390,030.45
1958	70	55	14	387,514.12
TOTAL				2,321,729.69
GRAND TOTAL				6,628,175.81

[a] Code DPH, "Accessions to Officer Strength, FY 1952-1962."

[b] Files of Officer Plans Section, G-1 Division, HQMC.

[c] All NROTC regulars on active duty 1 January 1963, are considered to have been regular accessions initially. Amortization rate is $516.45.

[d] Amortization rate is $1118.37.

Figure 22

not include the cost of acquiring and training a replacement for the lost officer.

That we have a regular officer retention problem, based on the preceding assumptions and conclusions, is evident. That this retention problem is costing money in terms of investment lost is also evident.

What has been shown here is but a small part of the problem and some representative cost figures which help to explain the problem in financial terms. But, what is the solution to the problem? How do we go about protecting our investment?

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Many studies and many individuals have devoted time and effort to the general problem of officer retention. Much has been written about retention in publications ranging from military periodicals to the Harvard Business Review.[1]

Many reasons have been offered to explain this retention failure. Some have said that it is the result of the poor public image of the military man; others that it is caused by poor military pay; and still others that it is because of the threat of prolonged family separations.

In the opinion of the author there is a grain of truth in all these explanations. But, a grain is insufficient for solution of the problem. We require more.

Of two independent studies conducted in the recent past, both concerning various aspects of the retention problem, one discovered that a married officer became a careerist if his wife is in favor of his remaining in the military, and, therefore,

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[1] William H. Bines, "A Call to Arms . . . for Peace," Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1960. Cf.

recommended that the Department of Defense place emphasis on actions to improve family living conditions and on public relations to increase the prestige of the military service. It further recommended that additional family quarters be provided to reduce the number of family separations caused by the lack of such quarters.[1]

The same study later reported that within the Army, Navy and Air Force a sampling of officers, undecided as to whether to adopt a service career, rated as the four most important environmental factors which would sway them in favor of a career, sufficient pay and allowances, improved promotional opportunity, more opportunity to live with their families, and the opportunity to change duty assignments. These same officers reported that the lack of or lessening in degree of any of these factors would most likely induce undecided officers to leave the service.

The other study, conducted at the Navy Management School, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, uncovered some interesting facts in relation to the Marine Corps officer retention problem. This study was limited to officers from the 12th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruitment District (including the states of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah and Arizona). A small sample of officers, who had been released since mid-1958, were questioned by mail as to the reason

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[1] Authoritative confidential source.

for their leaving the military service. Of the seventy-seven officers questioned, 85% responded. The following conclusions were drawn from the replies.

a. The major reasons which prompted these officers to leave the service were:

1. A lack of opportunity to develop and exercise abilities within capabilities.

2. Promotion based on seniority and not ability and demonstrated initiative.

3. Lack of opportunity to obtain duty assignments desired or needed for career planning.

4. Family hardships and prolonged family separations.

5. The possibility of being selected out of the Marine Corps before meeting retirement requirements.

6. No inclination on the part of the respondent to assume a military career.

b. Other important considerations were:

1. Pay was not an important consideration in swaying these officers to leave.

2. Fringe benefits were not important considerations.

3. Approximately half of the respondents had no intention of making the military a career at the time they entered active duty.[1]

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[1] Major James R. Gallman, et. al., "A Study of the Problem of Retention of Junior Officers of the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Marine Corps, and the U. S. Coast Guard," A research paper presented to the faculty of the Navy Management School, U. S. Navy Postgraduate School, May, 1961.

The conclusions of these two studies appear at odds with each other. The first study, which was much broader in scope and execution than was the second, may be considered as the more valid of the two and its conclusions the more sound. It would be difficult to support an opinion contrary to this.

But, the second study, limited and narrow as it is, concerned itself specifically with Marine Corps officers while the first queried officers from all services. In this is the key to the solution of the Marine Corps retention problem.

No individual is drafted into service as a Marine Corps officer. All Marine Corps officer accessions are voluntary. Consequently, a Marine Corps officer may be said to differ from all other officers in that his mental processes, desires, outlook, or the like, led him to decide on the Marine Corps as his chosen branch of service rather than one of the other branches. Therefore, since different forces, than those which affected men who sought commissions as officers in other services, appeared to have swayed the Marine Corps officer, it can be said that what may be career motivational to him is not necessarily what is career motivational to members of other services. If then, we are truly to study the retention problem within the Marine Corps, we must do it by studying the Marine Corps officer to determine what motivates him to seek or not seek a military career.

With this in mind the author discovered no Marine Corps sponsored survey, investigation, or study which actually queried a representative sample of Marine Corps officers to determine what made them decide to enter the Marine Corps, seek the Marine Corps as a career, or to leave the Marine Corps. Nor is there evidence that one had ever been initiated.

From this it may be concluded that we, as Marines, may think we know why officers do not seek military careers but we cannot be sure we know. Our conclusions can only be based on personal, limited experience and not on scientific study, and, as such, can be considered to be limited in validity.

For these reasons, and because the limited scope of this study does not allow a scientific sampling of officers in this regard, the author is incapable of offering a valid solution to the Marine Corps officer retention problem. Nor does he think such can become available until detailed research, conducted in a scientific manner within the Marine Corps, provides facts from which to draw conclusions.

APPENDIX I

TABULATION OF STUDENT MAN YEARS OF INSTRUCTION, BY COURSE, AT MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA, FY 1963

Course	Course Length ÷ 365	Number of Students Attending	Total Student Man Years of Instruction
1. Senior Course (Reserve) Phase I (1st increment)	.0328	55	1.80
(2nd increment)	.0328	50	1.64
Phase II (1st increment)	.0328	55	1.80
(2nd increment)	.0328	55	1.80
2. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons Employment Course (1st increment)	.0164	40	.66
(2nd increment)	.0767	40	3.07
3. Counter Insurgency Course	.0328	50	1.64
4. Junior Course (Reserve) Phase I (1st increment)	.0328	100	3.28
(2nd increment)	.0328	50	1.64
Phase II (1st increment)	.0328	100	3.28
(2nd increment)	.0328	50	1.64

5. Senior Course	.797	127	101.32
6. Junior Course	.797	200	159.4
7. Communication Officers Course			
2-62	.09	45	4.05
1-63	.51	45	22.95
2-63	.37	45	16.65
8. Communication Officer Orientation Course			
1-63	.082	35	2.87
2-63	.071	40	2.84
3-63	.071	40	2.84
4-63	.079	40	3.16
5-63	.0657	35	2.30
9. Reserve Communication Officer Course	.0328	13	.43
10. Reserve Artillery Officer Refresher Course	.0328	20	.66
11. Artillery Officer Orientation Course			
1-63	.0821	48	3.94
2-63	.071	48	3.41
3-63	.071	36	2.56
4-63	.079	35	2.77
5-63	.0657	40	2.63

12. Basic Course			
5-62	.3945	453	178.71
1-63	.4712	429	202.14
2-63	.5315	445	236.52
3-63	.5123	390	199.8
4-63	.4849	278	134.8
5-63	.1013	383	38.80
13. Marine Warrant Officer Basic Course	.2109	150	31.64
14. Special Indoctrination Course	.1369	45	6.16
15. Platoon Leader's Class			
Junior			
(1st increment)	.0575	1100	63.25
(2nd increment)	.1123	1000	112.30
(3rd increment)	.0575	1100	63.25
Senior			
(1st increment)	.0575	800	46.00
(2nd increment)	.1123	600	67.38
(3rd increment)	.0575	800	46.00
16. Naval Reserve Officer Training Course Class	.1123	334	37.51
17. Warrant Officer Candidate Screening Course	.1287	150	19.31
18. Officer Candidate Course			
31st	.2082	500	104.10
32nd	.2054	300	61.62
33rd	.2054	400	82.16

19. Ammo. Tech. (Adv)	.126	20	2.52
20. Ammo. Tech. (Basic)			
1-63	.1288	63	8.11
2-63	.137	62	8.49
4-63	.126	62	7.81
21. Arty. Wpns. Rep. (Adv.)	.126	10	1.26
22. Arty. Wpns. Rep.(Basic)			
1-63	.1534	20	3.07
2-63	.1671	20	3.34
3-63	.1562	20	3.12
4-63	.1562	20	3.12
23. Inf. Wpns. Arm. (Adv.)	.126	20	2.52
24. Inf. Wpns. Arm. (Basic)			
1-63	.1315	35	4.60
2-63	.1479	35	5.18
3-63	.1288	35	4.51
4-63	.1315	35	4.60
25. Opt. Inst.			
1-63	.1836	15	2.75
2-63	.1918	15	2.88
26. Rep. Shop Mech.			
1-63	.3288	15	4.93
2-63	.3178	15	4.77

27. Women Officer Candidate Course 16th	.0877	80	7.02
17th	.0603	80	4.82
28. Women Officer Basic Course (16th)	.1178	50	5.89
29. Women Marine Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership Course	.0795	27	2.15
Total			2185.94

MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS

SCHEDULE



KEY:

A B C D

DESIGNATION E/F (G) (H) (I) (J) (K)

A- ALLIED STUDENT REPORTING DATE IF SEPARATELY DIRECTED
B- REGULAR REPORTING DATE
C- CONVENING DATE
D- GRADUATION DATE
E- CLASS CAPACITY
F- TOTAL INPUT
G-K BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS, IF APPLICABLE, IN ORDER
(USMC) (USA) (USN) (USAF) (ALLIED)

SC	SENIOR COURSE (RESERVE) PHASE I&II
NBCWEC	NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT COURSE
CIC	COUNTER INSURGENCY COURSE
JC	JUNIOR COURSE (RESERVE) PHASE I&II
COOC	COMMUNICATION OFFICER ORIENTATION COURSE
RCOC	RESERVE COMMUNICATION OFFICER COURSE
AOOC	ARTILLERY OFFICER ORIENTATIO
RAORC	RESERVE ARTILLERY OFFICER REF
MWOBC	MARINE WARRANT OFFICER BA
SIC	SPECIAL INDOCTRINATION COUI
OCC	OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE
WOCSC	WARRANT OFFICER CANDIDATE

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F COURSES

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA



OURSE
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G COURSE

PLC	PLATOON LEADER CLASS (JR & SR)
NROTCC	NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS CLASS
ROORC	RESERVE ORDNANCE OFFICER REFRESHER COURSE
WOCC	WOMAN OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE
WOBC	WOMAN OFFICER BASIC COURSE
WMNCOLC	WOMAN MARINE NCO LEADERSHIP COURSE

EW Snedeker

E W SNEDEKER
Lieutenant General, United States Marine Corps
Commandant, Marine Corps Schools

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

SCHEDULE OF AVERAGE RATES (ESTIMATED) OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF CERTAIN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN, FISCAL YEAR 1964[a] (IN DOLLARS)

Rank	Base Pay	Flight Pay	Basic Allowance for Quarters		Standard Maintenance Allowance	Basic Allowance for Subsistence	Supplementary Clothing Allowance (Blues)
			W/Dependents	Without			
Colonel	11,102.67	2,940.00	2,041.20	1,681.20		574.56	
Lt Colonel	9,040.40	2,940.00	1,890.00	1,562.40		574.56	
Major	7,305.83	2,810.52	1,740.60	1,440.00		574.56	
Captain	5,692.96	2,283.36	1,560.60	1,260.00		574.56	
1st Lt	4,155.06	1,766.64	1,440.00	1,141.20		574.56	
2d Lt	3,014.48	1,355.64	1,321.20	1,022.40		574.56	
E-8	4,399.38		1,440.00	1,022.40	72.00	940.62[b]	41.85
E-7	3,828.12		1,378.80	900.00	72.00	940.62[b]	41.85
E-6	3,267.77		1,321.20	842.40	72.00	940.62[b]	41.85
E-5	2,735.30		1,260.00	842.40	72.00	940.62[b]	41.85
E-4	2,019.18		1,260.00	842.40	72.00	940.62[b]	41.85

[a] Department of the Navy, Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1964, Title I-Military Personnel, Appropriation Military Personnel Marine Corps, Reserve Personnel Marine Corps.

[b] When rations in kind are not available. The rate is $380.05 when authorized to mess separately when rations in kind are available.

APPENDIX IV

ESTIMATED COSTS OF TRAINING MARINE CORPS STUDENT PILOTS (AS OF MARCH 1963)[a]

(in dollars)

Course	Preflight	Primary	Basic	Advanced	Total
Helicopter	1655.00	1021.37	12,185.74	31,347.76	46,209.87
Jet	1655.00	1021.37	42,005.41	125,523.04	170,204.82

[a] Obtained through interview with Major T. C. Billings, USMC, OP 561C1, Navy Department, United States Navy. These costs do not include any overhead costs applicable but only include those costs readily identifiable as incurred in training these types of aviators.

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